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Expert Systems for Forecasting
Abstract
Expert systems use rules to represent experts’ reasoning in solving problems. The rules are based on
knowledge about methods and the problem domain. To acquire knowledge for an expert system, one
should rely on a variety of sources, such as textbooks, research papers, interviews, surveys, and protocol
analysis. Protocol analysis is especially useful if the area to be modeled is complex or if experts lack an
awareness of their processes. Expert systems should be easy to use, incorporate the best available
knowledge, and reveal the reasoning behind the recommendations they make. In forecasting, the most
promising applications of expert systems are to replace unaided judgment in cases requiring many
forecasts, to model complex problems where data on the dependent variable are of poor quality, and to
handle semi-structured problems. We found 15 comparisons of forecast validity involving expert systems.
As expected, expert systems were more accurate than unaided judgment, six comparisons to one, with
one tie. Expert systems were less accurate than judgmental bootstrapping in two comparisons with two
ties. There was little evidence with which to compare expert systems and econometric models; expert
systems were better in one study and tied in two.
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ABSTRACT
Expert systems use rules to represent experts’ reasoning in solving problems. The rules are based
on knowledge about methods and the problem domain. To acquire knowledge for an expert
system, one should rely on a variety of sources, such as textbooks, research papers, interviews,
surveys, and protocol analysis. Protocol analysis is especially useful if the area to be modeled is
complex or if experts lack an awareness of their processes. Expert systems should be easy to use,
incorporate the best available knowledge, and reveal the reasoning behind the recommendations
they make. In forecasting, the most promising applications of expert systems are to replace unaided
judgment in cases requiring many forecasts, to model complex problems where data on the
dependent variable are of poor quality, and to handle semi-structured problems. We found 15
comparisons of forecast validity involving expert systems. As expected, expert systems were more
accurate than unaided judgment, six comparisons to one, with one tie. Expert systems were less
accurate than judgmental bootstrapping in two comparisons with two ties. There was little
evidence with which to compare expert systems and econometric models; expert systems were
better in one study and tied in two.
Keywords: inductive techniques, judgmental bootstrapping, knowledge acquisition, production
systems, protocol analysis, retrospective process tracing.

Imagine trying to predict the proper medical treatment for a patient. If you have a good measure of success and a
substantial record of results from prior cases, you could develop an econometric model to predict which treatment
would produce the best results. Based on extensive research over the past half century, the econometric approach
would almost always be more accurate than unaided judgment, and as shown in an extensive review by Grove and
Meehl (1996), it is difficult to find exceptions to this conclusion. But what if the treatment options include new
procedures? You could ask experts to make forecasts about the chances of success for each new procedure. When
many forecasts are needed, that approach can be expensive and inconsistent. In such situations, it is useful to develop
a model of an expert, then use the model to make forecasts.
One way to develop a model of an expert is to infer the rules that experts are using. This approach, called
judgmental bootstrapping, is nearly always more accurate than an unaided expert (Armstrong 2001b). Alternatively,
you could study how an expert makes predictions and develop an expert system to represent the process. In other
words, knowledge is elicited directly from the expert. The focus of this paper is on expert systems for forecasting.
Expert systems have been used to forecast time series and to predict outcomes on the basis of crosssectional data. Armstrong, Adya and Collopy (2001) discuss their application to time series forecasting. In this
paper, we examine the use of expert systems for cross-sectional prediction.
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DEVELOPING EXPERT SYSTEMS FOR FORECASTING
Building expert forecasting systems consists of three tasks: acquiring relevant knowledge, structuring and applying
the knowledge, and testing the system. We discuss the first two of these tasks here. The third task, testing expert
systems, is mentioned only briefly because, in general, it requires the same testing procedures as testing other types
of forecasting methods. Those procedures are discussed in Armstrong (2001a).

ACQUIRE RELEVANT KNOWLEDGE
The first task in developing an expert system is to acquire relevant knowledge. This is considered the most difficult
aspect of developing expert systems, and is often referred to as the knowledge acquisition bottleneck. Acquiring
knowledge can be difficult because performing a task is often second nature to experts and they may find it difficult
to describe how they do the task.
Some fields lend themselves more readily to knowledge acquisition than others. In rare situations, such as in
law cases, detailed documentation might be available on how decisions or predictions were made. Kort (1957) used
such knowledge to develop an expert system for the U. S. Supreme Court’s decisions on right-to-counsel cases. More
generally, you will need to elicit knowledge from experts directly by using questionnaires, in-depth interviews, or
retrospective process tracing.
•

Ask experts to describe the rules they use.

Developers of expert systems should seek knowledge from expert forecasters. There are a number of ways
to do this, as listed in Exhibit 1. To find out how this is typically done, Doukidis and Paul (1990) surveyed members
of the Operational Research Society, receiving replies from 26% of their sample. Eighty-five percent of the 265
respondents indicated that their organizations had developed expert systems.
Exhibit 1
Knowledge Acquisition Procedures for Developing Expert Systems
Percentage of
developers
using*
Interviewing experts
Questionnaires
Taking experts through case studies
Use of induction techniques [judgmental bootstrapping]
Retrospective process tracing
Recording experts at work [protocols]
Literature reviews

100
—
28
18
—
16
—

* The percentages were adapted from Doukidis and Paul (1990)
All of the developers Doukidis and Paul (1990) surveyed said that they had used interviews of experts. Such
interviews can provide information about the variables experts use to make predictions and the relative weights they
assign to the variables. Interviews are most useful when the rules are clear and the expert is aware of the problemsolving process. Even when the process is not easy to explain, however, interviews may help to initially identify
important variables.
Collopy and Armstrong (1989) found that when asked about extrapolation methods, experts spoke for about
30 minutes. These interviews were related to general extrapolation strategies. One would expect that interviews
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directed to a specific problem would provide a richer source of information. This was the case when McClain (1972)
asked doctors to describe how they made decisions about using medical resources in specific situations and how they
assigned weights to various factors. The task took about three hours per doctor. In addition, McClain spent much
time analyzing the recordings.
Although not mentioned by Doukidis and Paul (1990), questionnaires are useful when problems are well
defined. They provide a cost-effective way to obtain information from many domain experts. Open-ended
questionnaires can provide information about general strategies used by expert forecasters. Structured questionnaires
are more efficient in that analysts can obtain information about strategies used under various conditions.
In retrospective process tracing, experts are asked to reconstruct the thought processes they used when
making judgments. This was not specifically examined by Doukidis and Paul (1990). In some cases, it might yield
better descriptions than could be obtained by inferring the process, as shown by Larcker and Lessig (1983). In their
study of decisions to purchase stocks, they compared an expert system based on retrospective process tracing to a
judgmental bootstrapping model. Thirty-one subjects provided decisions for 45 stocks, based on six information cues
(average price, change in earnings per share, average change in earnings per share, dividend yield, debt/equity, and
beta). The names of the stocks were not revealed to the subjects. Subjects needed about 30 minutes to provide the
retrospective process descriptions. The average number of cases for which the expert systems reproduced the
decision was 84.8 %, while for the bootstrapped models it was 73.0 %.
For complex tasks, retrospective process tracing may be ineffective because it relies on memory. Also,
experts may remember themselves as being more rational than they were. For example, what personnel managers
would remember taking into account height, weight, gender, looks, dress, and accent when describing how they
selected the most promising candidates for an office job?
•

When experts lack awareness of their thought processes or when the process is complex, use
protocols.

Sometimes experts have difficulty explaining how they make their judgments. They often refer to their most
important judgments as intuitive. Consequently, they may be unable to reveal what knowledge they use and how they
use it. Cocozza and Steadman (1978) found that psychiatrists acting as expert witnesses did not have a good
understanding of how they made predictions about the potential dangerousness of defendants in court cases.
Protocols can be useful in such situations.
In protocol analysis, an expert is asked to think aloud while engaged in a diagnostic process, such as making
forecasts. Protocol sessions with experts yield more detailed and specific information about rules than can generally
be obtained from interviews. In the Doukidis and Paul (1990) survey, only about 16% of the developers used
protocols.
Protocol analysis requires more time than interviewing. In one protocol study, Kleinmuntz (1968) reported
tape recording for 60 hours to construct a model of a single decision maker. Clarkson (1962) devoted his entire PhD
dissertation to the process a single investment trust officer used to select stocks for an investment portfolio. Because
protocols can be expensive, one should use them only if necessary.
•

Incorporate knowledge from empirical literature.

Research on decision making suggests that experts are good at identifying characteristics of a decision
situation. However, they are not able to keep complex relationships straight when there are many variables and they
have difficulty assessing the magnitude of relationships. Also, they may see what they expect to see. Chapman and
Chapman (1969) asked 32 experts to examine data from homosexual and heterosexual subjects. They contrived the
data so that relationships the experts expected did not exist. The clinicians had great difficulty in seeing valid
relationships in the data even though their effects were large. Instead, they saw the relationships they expected.
To overcome these shortcomings in experts’ perceptions, the developer of an expert system can draw upon
information from econometric studies. Econometric relationships are typically more valid than those surmised by an
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expert. They have the advantages of being organized and tested, and they are also more likely to be free of biases.
Allen and Fildes (2001) describe econometric procedures.
Meta-analyses of findings from econometric studies are especially valuable. For example, assume that an
expert system is needed to forecast how price changes would affect the sales of a technical book. An expert’s
judgment could be supplemented by a meta-analysis such as the one by Tellis (1988), who reported price elasticities
for a variety of products and conditions.
•

Use multiple sources of knowledge.

A single expert can serve as a starting point, but where possible, you should consult additional experts,
perhaps as many as five. Leonard’s (1995) system to detect bank fraud was based on interviews with twelve experts.
Often, however, researchers do not use multiple sources. Abramson et al. (1996), Clarkson (1962), Moss, Artis and
Ormerod (1994), and Stewart et al. (1989) all based their systems on a single expert’s input. The use of a single
expert may provide an incomplete representation of the knowledge.
Knowledge from prior research can be combined with the knowledge from experts. Greater weight should
be placed on empirical results to the extent they are reliable and valid. On the other hand, more weight should be
placed on experts’ knowledge to the extent that they receive good feedback about their forecasts.
In developing expert systems, one can also draw upon judgmental bootstrapping for knowledge about
relationships. This can be helpful when experts make good forecasts but lack awareness of how they are making
them. Reagan-Cirincione (1994) followed this procedure. She used structured group procedures to help experts
compare the models they described with the estimates from their own bootstrapping models. By focusing on the
differences, she was able to make revisions that improved the expert system’s accuracy.
Conjoint analysis is still another source of knowledge about relationships (see Wittink and Bergestuen
2001). It is useful when participants can provide good assessments of how they would respond to changes. It can be
especially useful in cases where experts are not able to describe how participants might react to changes.

STRUCTURING AND APPLYING THE KNOWLEDGE
Once you gather knowledge from experts, you should represent it so that it can be easily used. The most common
way to represent knowledge and expertise in expert systems is as production rules. Production rules are conditionaction statements, such as “IF credit history is poor, THEN do not approve loan.” In their survey of operations
researchers, Doukidis and Paul (1990) found that 62% of their respondents used such rules to represent knowledge in
their expert systems.
•

Strive for simplicity.

In attempting to realistically represent what experts do, there is a danger that the system might become too
complex. The interaction effects of many simple rules can be difficult to understand unless the rules are well
organized. To avoid overly complex systems, design production systems to make it easy to examine existing rules
and to revise them or add new rules.
An expert system should not impose cognitive strain on its users. In an expert system developed by one of
the authors to predict the effectiveness of advertisements, an analyst had to rate as many as 235 features of an
advertisement. One way to reduce strain is to structure the system so that its organization is intuitive. Another is to
make reasonable assumptions about defaults that apply to most common situations and alter these only as needed.
•

Strive for completeness.

The knowledge encoded in an expert system should represent all key aspects of the problem because users
of the system are likely to assume that it is comprehensive. Fischhoff, Slovic and Lichtenstein (1978) studied the use
of a fault tree for the maintenance of automobiles. A fault tree describes the paths one can follow to diagnose a
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problem. For example, one could use a fault tree to diagnose why a car does not start properly (e.g., check battery).
They found that subjects, including experts, tended to ignore things left out of the tree. They overlooked omitted
conditions even when they probably would not have overlooked them had they relied on unaided judgment. The
authors concluded that once a decision aid is adopted, “out of sight was out of mind.”
Dijkstra (1995) conducted an experiment to determine whether experts can be easily misled when an expert
system is incomplete. He constructed two expert systems for judging whether a defendant was guilty of a criminal
attempt. While both expert systems were logically correct, each omitted critical information; one focused on the act
while the other was based on intent. Dijkstra presented nine cases to 30 law students and 33 law professors. Typical
case: “Mr. Smith has been increasingly upset at the noise from his neighbor’s motorcycle. One afternoon, he sees it
unattended, so he steals it and dumps it into a river. Unknown to him, Mr. Smith’s wife had purchased the bike for
him earlier that day.” The two expert systems gave opposite advice on each case. Decisions by the subjects,
especially the lawyers, were highly influenced by the expert systems that they were given.
•

Fully disclose the knowledge in the system.

If users know what research and knowledge are included in the system, they should be better able to judge
when it can be used. In addition, other researchers can build upon disclosed expert systems, rather than starting from
scratch. Full disclosure also makes it easier to resolve inconsistencies in the rules and allows users to learn from
knowledge encoded in the system. Finally, full disclosure of the knowledge used in an expert system allows for
judging the face validity of the system.
•

Explanations should be provided by the expert system.

Expert systems should explain why they make particular recommendations. Complete and well supported
explanations provide a way of examining the face validity of the knowledge in the expert system. They may also
increase the user’s confidence in the system. In addition, explanations can help the analyst to learn about the process.
Finally, explanations may help forecasters to spot situations in which the expert system is not relevant. While it is
desirable to provide explanations, the designer should recognize that it is difficult to get people to use them.

TESTING EXPERT SYSTEMS
For the most part, testing an expert system is like testing any forecasting method (Armstrong 2001a). However, a test
of face validity, the Turing test (Turing 1950), has been used to compare outputs.
•

Use the Turing test to assess expert systems that replace judgment.

The Turing test examines whether a panel of experts can distinguish differences in outputs from an expert
system and an expert. The panel could present problems and request forecasts, along with explanations, from the
expert system and from unaided experts. Based on the responses, the experts on the panel are asked to identify which
forecasts come from the expert and which come from the expert system.
Conducting a Turing test is appropriate when comparative accuracy of different methods is difficult to
assess, the problem involves much uncertainty, and the prediction problem is complex. For example, when doctors
must predict what types of treatment are most appropriate for a patient and they have no prior outcome measures, it is
useful to know whether the expert system can produce predictions that are similar to those of the best experts.

CONDITIONS FAVORING USE OF EXPERT SYSTEMS
Expert systems are expensive to develop, so it is important to identify the conditions under which they will be useful.
Χ Relative to other forecasting approaches, expert systems are best suited to situations in which:
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. . . experts make repetitive forecasts.
Because expert systems are costly to develop, their use makes most sense when many forecasts are needed.
This occurs for many problems, such as: Which drilling sites are most likely to yield oil at reasonable cost?
What products are most likely to be profitable in the current market? Which drug treatments will be the
most successful for particular patients?
. . . the problems are semi-structured.
The kinds of problems that are most likely to benefit from the use of expert systems are those that are semistructured. In contrast, for problems that are well structured, statistical techniques (such as regression) can
provide good forecasts, while problems that are highly unstructured cannot be translated into rules.
. . . historical data on the dependent variable are unavailable or of poor quality.
When there is not much historical data on the dependent variable or when these data are of poor quality,
expert systems may help. They are also expected to be applicable where the underlying processes are
subject to changes that are apparent to the experts.
. . . cooperative experts are available.
The development of expert systems depends upon having willing and cooperative experts. It may require
extensive time with the expert to develop rules that cover all conditions.

EVIDENCE ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF EXPERT SYSTEMS
Our search for evidence relied heavily upon citations in papers and books. Some references were provided by
researchers specializing in expert systems. Computer searches of the Social Science Citation Index and Social
Science Index were made through early 2000. Using the term “expert systems and forecasting,” we located 51
studies. Of these, only two were relevant to our paper, and they were only tangentially related. Requests for help
were posted on the forecasting principles website and were sent to e-mail lists, but these produced no additional
studies. Given the massive literature on expert systems, it is interesting that we found only about 35 studies directly
relevant to the use of expert systems in forecasting.
Our search was difficult because many researchers claiming to use expert systems did not use systems that
fit our definition. For example, Moore (1998) claimed to use an expert system to predict the performance of MBA
candidates based on information available in their applications. He induced rules using a statistical procedure that
related attributes to prior decisions. We would consider this to be a type of econometric method. On the other hand,
some who used systems that conformed to our definition did not refer to them as expert systems.
One reason for the small number of papers is that forecasting is only one of many uses for expert systems. Wong
and Monaco (1995), in their review of the literature between 1977 and 1993, concluded that out of ten uses
mentioned, prediction was the fifth most important use of expert systems. It was well behind planning and
monitoring, and about equal with design and interpretation. Eom (1996), in his review of 440 papers on expert
systems published between 1980 and 1983, found that only 17 (4%) were applied to forecasting problems.
Of the papers that used expert systems for forecasting, few directly examined comparative forecast validity.
The small number of validation studies that we found is consistent with Santhanam and Elam’s (1998) survey of
knowledge-based systems research in decisions sciences. They found only ten validation studies among the 430
studies of expert systems published in major management journals between 1980 and 1995.
Overall, we found 15 comparisons on the predictive validity of expert systems. This lack of validation testing is
perhaps the major conclusion from our search. Even if one were using expert systems for other purposes, such as
design or planning, it would be useful to show that they had predictive validity.
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We anticipated that researchers would find that expert systems were more accurate than unaided judgment, if only
because they use structured knowledge. In comparison with judgmental bootstrapping, we had no prior hypothesis
because we could formulate hypotheses favoring either approach. We anticipated that econometric models would be
more accurate than expert systems in well-structured situations. This is because they make better use of information.
Exhibit 2 summarizes the comparisons. It starts with situations where expert systems were expected to be more
accurate.
Exhibit 2
Comparative Accuracy of Expert Systems
Expert Systems vs.:
Judgment
ES Better

Study

•
•
•
•
•
•

Reagan-Cirincione (1994)
Reagan-Cirincione (1994)
Kleinmuntz (1967)
Smith et al. (1996)
Michael (1971)
Silverman (1992)

Task

Criteria

Results

Teachers’ salaries
Baseball team records
Student adjustment
Gas demand
Mail order catalog sales
Army equipment capability

Correlation
Correlation
Classification errors
Mean absolute deviation
Sales volume
Bias

ES much more accurate
ES much more accurate
ES error less by 16%
ES error less by 10%
ES error less by 5%
ES eliminated bias

Similar

• Stewart et al (1989)

Weather (hail)

Correlation

ES Worse

• Leonard (1995)

Credit card fraud

Classification errors

Bootstrapping
ES Better

–––

–––

–––

Similar

• Yntema & Torgerson (1961)
• Einhorn et al. (1979)

Artificial task
Nutrition

Correlation
Classification errors

ES Worse

• Schmitt (1978)

Academic success

Correlation

• Einhorn et al. (1979)

Psychological adjustment

Classification errors

• Leonard (1995)

Credit card fraud

Classification errors

• Moninger et al. (1991)
• Stewart (1989)

Weather
Weather (hail)

Correlation
Correlation

Econometric Model
ES Better
Similar
ES Worse

–––

–––

–––

–––
ES detected 71% fraud;
experts detected 80%
–––
–––
–––
ES less accurate
ES 73% correct vs.
bootstrapping 91%
ES detected 71% fraud;
AID detected 66%
–––
–––
–––

Comparisons with Judgment
The overwhelming superiority of judgmental bootstrapping over judgment has been thought to result
largely from its greater consistency (Armstrong 2001b). Given that expert systems also provide consistency to the
forecasting process, one would expect that they would also be more accurate than unaided expert forecasts. As it
turned out, they were more accurate in six comparisons, tied in one, and worse in one.
In a paper that does not use the term expert system, Reagan-Cirincione (1994) provides an excellent example of the
application of principles for the development of an expert system. She asked judges to describe how they would
make predictions for two problems, the first being to predict the average teacher’s salary in each of the 50 states,
and the second to predict the number of games a baseball team won during a season. Using this information, she
developed expert systems. She asked her judges to make predictions for a sample of cases. The expert systems were
much more accurate than the judges’ direct predictions.
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Kleinmuntz (1967) employed protocols to code the rules an expert used to predict how subjects who had sought
counseling would adjust to college life. The rules were based on information from a psychological inventory (the
MMPI). Kleinmuntz’s comparison between clinicians and the expert system used data on 720 students from five
colleges. Eight clinicians, all with reputations for their skills at interpreting MMPI results, misclassified 34.4% of
the cases. In contrast, the expert system missed on only 28.8% — a reduction of 16.3% in the error.
In a study of gas demand, Smith, Hussein and Leonard (1996) described an expert system that British Gas used to
forecast short-term demand. Expert knowledge from 72 geographically scattered shift officers was obtained through
structured interviews, questionnaires, and retrospective case descriptions. The expert system proved to be more
accurate than forecasts from the shift control officers.
Michael (1971) developed an expert system based on the rules used by an expert who forecasted catalogue sales. He
obtained the rules by asking the expert to explain how he had made specific forecasts in the past (i.e., retrospective
process tracing). The forecasting task, which involved 42 items, was difficult because it was performed at the
beginning of the season before any feedback had been received on sales. In terms of unit sales, the average error for
the expert was 28.8%. The expert system was more accurate with an average error of 27.1% — a reduction of
almost six percent. He obtained similar results when using sales dollars as the criterion (a 4.3% reduction in error).
The biggest improvements were achieved for the “major new articles,” but there were only three of these.
In his study of army planners, Silverman (1992) compared an expert system to unaided judgment. Silverman
developed a system to help analysts predict how new equipment would perform in various environments. The
system was designed to remove biases from these forecasts by identifying the application of irrelevant or
overlooked knowledge. Protocol sessions with one expert helped Silverman to identify recurring biases. He found
biases in each of the 22 assessments in which subjects did not use the expert system. When nine subjects repeated
the task using the expert system, unaware of the biases in their earlier answers, none of their forecasts contained
biases.
Stewart et al. (1989) compared an expert system with judgment. The expert system, developed from conversations
with only one expert, consisted of 250 rules based on seven cues. Stewart et al. presented seven meteorologists with
Doppler radar scans of 75 storms, and each made probability forecasts of hail and severe hail. Forecasts from the
expert system were a little less accurate than all but one of the experts for forecasts of hail, and a bit more accurate
than all but the best of the experts for forecasts of severe hail. Relative to judgment then, the expert system’s
performance was mixed.
Leonard (1995) described an expert system for detecting bank fraud. Twelve bank managers were involved in
developing the rule base. It made use of a dozen predictor variables, such as the number of authorizations at the
same merchant and the current balance as a percent of limit. Examples of the rules used are “If there have been
previous purchases within the last 24 hours at the same merchant, then call customer” and “If the time since the last
transaction is less than 30 minutes, then investigate further.” The resulting expert system had a slightly higher
overall accuracy than the classifications of the bankers themselves (92% vs. 90%). However, with respect to the
primary function of the model, it identified only 71% of actual frauds, compared with 80% by the experts.
Comparisons with Judgmental Bootstrapping
Yntema and Torgerson (1961), using an artificial task, provided pictures of 180 ellipses to six judges. The ellipses
were assigned values based on their size, shape, and color. The worth of an item increased with size, thinness, and
brownness. Yntema and Torgerson developed an expert system for each judge by asking judges what weights they
placed on each of the three variables. The resulting models were as accurate as those based on judgmental
bootstrapping.
Schmitt (1978) asked 112 students to predict the academic success of a group of subjects based on four variables.
For this problem, students were expected to have some expertise. The data used were contrived (simulated). After
practicing on 20 “applicants,” the students made comparisons for 30 new “applicants.” Three different approaches
for asking questions led to expert systems of comparable accuracy. These expert systems were a bit less accurate
than judgmental bootstrapping.
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Einhorn, Kleinmuntz and Kleinmuntz (1979) compared judgmental bootstrapping and process-tracing models in
two experiments. The first experiment was to assess the degree of adjustment of 96 students based on a
psychological assessment (MMPI profiles). Each profile contained 16 variables. The judges sorted the students into
12 categories based on their degree of adjustment. The researchers used process tracing with one judge to develop
an expert system. A four-variable judgmental bootstrapping model did a much better job of modeling the actual
judgment than the expert system. It had 9 misclassifications of 65 students, versus 26 misclassifications for the
expert system. In their second experiment, a single subject rated the nutritional quality of breakfast cereals on the
basis of 11 cues. A protocol analysis produced seven rules for the expert system. The resulting judgmental
bootstrapping and expert systems had similar accuracy.

Comparisons with Econometric Methods
Expert systems might have advantages over econometric models because they can handle messier problems. But
econometric models typically make more effective use of information on the dependent variable for problems that
are well structured.
Leonard (1995), in a study of credit-card fraud, examined predictions for 12,132 accounts. Although an
econometric model (developed using Automatic Interaction Detector, or AID) was slightly more accurate overall,
the expert system was more effective for fraud cases (71% correct versus 66%).
Moninger et al. (1991) evaluated systems based on artificial intelligence to forecast severe storms. Three of these
systems were traditional expert systems, another was a hybrid system including a linear model augmented by a small
expert system, and two others were based on linear (econometric-type) models. On each day of a three-month test,
the systems generated 2 to 9-hour forecasts of the probabilities of occurrence of nonsignificant, significant, and
severe weather in four regions of Colorado. The two traditional expert systems appeared best able to discriminate
significant from nonsignificant weather events. Both of these systems required the analyst to make sophisticated
meteorological judgments. However, one of the expert systems produced forecasts that were biased.
In Stewart et al. (1989), an expert system to forecast hail was better than only one of a number of regression models.
When the forecasts were limited to severe hail, the expert system was better than all of the regression models.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTITIONERS
There are benefits and risks associated with expert systems. Given the lack of validation studies, there is also much
uncertainty.
Benefits
Expert systems can improve accuracy by making the predictions of the best experts available to anyone who wishes
to use them. Thus, users might obtain predictions for medical cases from the top medical specialists or they might
get legal advice from the leading lawyers.
Like judgmental bootstrapping and econometric models, expert systems can improve consistency to allow for
comparisons among forecasts for alternative policies. Consistency can convey the impression of rationality and this
may help to persuade people to use the forecasts. For instance, one of the benefits cited for Texas Instruments’
Capital Expert was its ability to enforce consistency in the preparation of capital expenditure proposals across the
company (Gill 1995). Consistency can also enhance fairness, which can be important for the allocation of resources
by government agencies, schools, hospitals, and other organizations.
Expert systems can improve the persuasiveness of recommendations. Dijkstra, Liebrand & Timminga (1998)
presented 85 subjects with four problems concerning dyslexia, law, cardiology, and train tickets. Experts and expert
systems provided the same advice, but the subjects believed that the advice from the expert systems was more
objective and more rational than that from experts.
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By describing the current process, expert systems may provide clues about how to improve the process. Various
aspects of the problem can be studied and the findings can be incorporated into the expert system.
Perhaps the most important benefit is that expert systems can reduce the cost of making decisions and forecasts.
Based on his survey of publications describing 440 expert systems in business, Eom (1996) concluded that cost
savings are the primary motivation for their use.
When cost-saving and consistency are the prime considerations, expert systems can be justified if they merely
reproduce the experts’ forecasts. For example, Kort (1957) developed an expert system for the U. S. Supreme
Court’s decisions on right-to-counsel cases. The forecasts by the expert system matched the actual decisions by the
Court for all 14 cases in a validation sample in later years. Although one could not replace the Supreme Court,
expert systems could be used in many tasks such as in the selection of candidates for programs in higher education.

Risks
Design, implementation, and maintenance of expert systems are expensive. The process of eliciting, reconciling, and
validating knowledge from multiple sources is difficult. As the complexity of the problem increases, it becomes
more difficult to elicit knowledge and to extract meaningful rules. Many rules may be required to represent a
complex problem.
It can be difficult to maintain expert systems when domain knowledge changes. Even more important perhaps is
ensuring that the expert systems are acceptable to new decision makers. In 1987, Gill (1995) identified 97 expert
systems that had been introduced into organizations during the early and mid-1980s. In 1992, he used phone
interviews to determine the status of each system, obtaining information on 73 of the systems. Of this group, only
about one-third of the expert systems were still being used. The decline occurred even though the expert systems
always improved consistency and 86% of the users thought that they led to better decisions. Explanations that were
given for discarding the expert systems involved system-maintenance expenses and such organizational factors as
changing priorities and loss of developers. Developers of expert systems often failed to obtain and maintain user
commitment to the systems. Fewer than one-quarter of the abandoned systems were criticized for bad performance.
Some expert systems might have failed because the experts viewed them as a threat to their positions. After all, how
many of us would be agreeable to our organizations replacing us with an expert system? Armstrong and Yokum
(2000) found that potential adopters perceived significant risks associated with the use of expert systems. On the
other hand, they viewed expert systems positively with respect to their compatibility with their job, the ability to
experiment with parts of the system, and ease of understanding.
Guimaraes, Yoon and Clevenson (1996), in their study of 1,200 expert systems at E. I. DuPont, concluded that it
was important to establish training programs for developers and end-users. Developers must be trained in using
appropriate knowledge elicitation techniques and modeling knowledge effectively. Their study found a strong
relationship between the impact of expert systems on end-users jobs and the success of such systems.
Expert systems are sometimes used uncritically. For example, over 20 students in one of our classes used an expert
system to predict the persuasiveness of some advertisements. As it turned out, a programming error had rendered
about 25% of the system inoperable. None of the students recognized that their inputs to that part of the program
had no effect on their ratings of an ad’s effectiveness.
We suggest that the use of expert systems be restricted to complex situations in which forecasts are made
repeatedly, when there is little or poor data on the dependent value, and when the alternative would be unaided
judgment. Where possible, expert system forecasts should be supplemented by forecasts from other approaches.
Finally, expert systems should be comprehensive as they might be used uncritically.

IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCHERS
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Despite the extensive literature on expert systems, little of it concerns the development and use of expert systems for
forecasting. Research is needed on different approaches to developing expert systems. When is it best to ask people
to say directly how they solve a problem, when should protocols be used, and when should a combination of these
approaches be used?
Research is also needed on the conditions under which expert systems are superior to alternative procedures.
Researchers should examine accuracy and other criteria, such as relative costs and acceptability. We expect that
expert systems will prove most appropriate for messy problems for which experts can make fairly accurate
predictions.
Expert systems might also help analysts to select the best forecasting method for a particular situation. Weitz (1986)
and Nute, Mann and Brewer (1990) developed general models though they did not test them. Ashouri (1993)
developed an expert system to decide which of a set of forecasting methods would be most effective in predicting
daily gas demand.

CONCLUSIONS
When acquiring knowledge for an expert system, it is desirable to use many techniques. Protocol analyses of experts
who are actually engaged in the task can produce usable knowledge in complex situations where the rules are not
self-evident.
Knowledge representations should be simple so that users can know what the system is doing. Because users will
tend to become dependent on the system, it is important that it be valid and comprehensive.
The most surprising finding was that so little research has been done to examine the predictive validity of expert
systems. We found only 15 validation comparisons of expert systems for forecasting. Expert systems were more
accurate than unaided expert judgment in six of eight comparisons. In the four comparisons we found with
judgmental bootstrapping, expert systems were less accurate in two and tied in two. Expert systems were more
accurate than econometric models in one study and tied in two.
Given the high development costs and the meager evidence on improving predictive validity, we see two major uses
of expert systems. The first is to develop systems when one needs many forecasts and the problem is too messy for
judgmental bootstrapping. In such cases, one can expect some gains in accuracy. Second, and more important,
expert systems can produce substantial cost savings by merely matching the accuracy of the best experts in semistructured problems that do not lend themselves to judgmental bootstrapping.
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